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ABSTRACT 
A virtual machine monitor (VMM) supports execution of multiple unmodified operating 
systems in virtual machines (VMs) on one computer. VMM support has been added to 
the Intel IA 32 architecture.  Enforcement of data flow policies between VMs requires a 
highly trustworthy VMM.  Such VMMs take advantage of hardware support.  The work 
described here explores whether the Naval Postgraduate School Least Privilege 
Separation Kernel (LPSK) can incorporate Intel hardware support for virtualization. 
The Intel documentation and LPSK code were reviewed to determine the changes 
required to transition the target processor to Virtual Machine Extension (VMX) root 
operation.  First, paging in the LPSK had to be enabled. Requirements for the VMXON 
and VMXOFF instructions were determined and changes were made to the LPSK to 
enable the target processor to transition to VMX root operation.   
Testing showed that the changes to the LPSK allowed the target processor to 
successfully transition to and from VMX root operation. 
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Software for the virtualization of computer hardware has existed for some time.  
This type of software allows multiple Operating Systems to operate on one physical CPU 
and is often called a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).  IBM was working on developing 
the CP-67, which was one of the earliest versions of a virtual machine monitor, in the 
1960s. A virtual machine monitor (VMM) is software that provides isolated duplicate 
copies of the actual machine environment for virtual machines to operate in.  A virtual 
machine (VM) is software that operates within this duplicate machine environment 
provided to it by the VMM. Goldberg defines a virtual machine in the following way:  
A hardware-software duplicate of a real existing computer system in 
which a statistically dominant subset of the virtual processor’s instructions 
execute on the host processor in native mode. [1] 
 A VMM is a control program that handles the accesses of the VMs to the real 
hardware of the system (i.e., memory, hard drives and I/O devices).  VMMs have been 
classified into two categories, Type I and Type II.  A Type I VMM is described as 
running directly on hardware, and a Type II VMM is loaded as an application on an 
existing host operating system.  Because of the VMM’s unique position of controlling the 
resources of the system that are provided to each VM, the VMM concept has been 
applied in the development of systems designed to separate mandatory security classes.   
Software that is designed to separate the resources of a system into partitions and 
control access flows between these partitions is called a “separation kernel.”  Recently, 
the Information Assurance Directorate of the U.S. National Security Agency published a 
guideline for developing separation kernels for environments requiring high robustness.  
This guideline is called the Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [2]. One of the 
requirements of this guideline is that the separation kernel implements the principle of 
least privilege (PoLP) to ensure subjects only have as much access to system resources as 
necessary for their intended functions.   
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As a part of the Trusted Computing Exemplar project, a group at the Naval 
Postgraduate School designed and prototyped a separation kernel to meet the 
requirements of the SKPP.  This kernel implements the principle of least privilege and 
was termed a “least privilege separation kernel” (LPSK).  Timothy Levine et al. 
described the LPSK’s implementation as follows:  
Each subject is only given a minimum set of logically separated resources 
necessary to perform its assigned task, and the sharing of resources 
between subjects is rigorously controlled by the kernel. A separation 
kernel that correctly implements these properties can meet the objective to 
minimize and confine damage with a high level of assurance.  [3] 
B. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
Most VMMs in the past ran on large mainframe computers because commodity 
processors were not designed to be virtualized.  To meet the need for a commodity 
processor that can be used for VMMs, Intel has developed processors with virtualization 
technology built in so that the Intel IA 32 architecture is virtualizable. Intel added 
instructions to the instruction set to handle virtualization.  The extra instructions 
implemented on the Intel architecture, are called Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX).  
With these instructions handled in the hardware, the process of controlling virtualization 
can be simpler and faster.  Under Intel’s virtualization environment, there are two modes 
of operation, VMX root operation and VMX non-root operation.  Software controlling 
the virtual environment (i.e., the VMM) runs in VMX root operation and guest operating 
systems that run on top of the controlling software (i.e., the VMs) run in VMX non-root 
operation.  The effort of this thesis will be to determine the requirements for booting and 
transitioning the LPSK into the VMX root operation, in order to allow the LPSK to 
operate as a VMM.  Some of the benefits of allowing the LPSK to run in a virtualized 
environment are: 
 The ability to run multiple Operating Systems that each can operate with 
different security attributes. 
 Higher confidence in a VMM running multiple OSs that cannot 
communicate through covert channels. 
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 This system could potentially allow multiple OSs on one computer to 
operate in a non-system high environment. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II provides an 
introduction to virtual machines, separation kernels, and the least privilege separation 
kernel.  Chapter III describes the implementation details of booting and transitioning the 
LPSK to VMX root operation on the Intel IA 32 architectures.  Chapter IV gives a brief 
introduction to the virtual machine control structure (VMCS) and its purpose in the Intel 
IA 32 architecture.  Chapter V describes the conclusions drawn from the efforts of this 
thesis and proposes possible future work that could be performed. 
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II. INTRODUCTION TO VIRTUAL MACHINES  
A. VIRTUAL MACHINES 
The history of virtual machines reaches back to the early 1960s.  They were 
originally developed to solve some specific problems that system programmers 
experienced when developing and testing operating systems for computers.  First, system 
programmers could not test their changes to system programs without having full access 
to the system and its hardware.  This meant that other users could not be using the system 
at the time the system programmer did tests.  So, system programs were often tested in 
off hours, when the work would not interrupt that of other system users.  Second, to test 
efficiencies of different designs of system programs, each change would have to be 
loaded and tested individually.  To resolve these and other issues, system designers at 
IBM [4] in the early 1960s began to develop a means to partition a computer into smaller 
versions of itself called virtual machines.  Although other companies were developing 
similar solutions, IBM’s was one of the first to be commercialized.  Goldberg defines a 
virtual machine as:  
A hardware-software duplicate of a real existing computer system in 
which a statistically dominant subset of the virtual processor’s instructions 
execute on the host processor in native mode. [1]   
A Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) is a control program that provides the 
duplicate versions of the host machine to the Virtual Machines (VMs).  The VMM will 
provide each VM with resources. In some cases, such as for portions of memory, these 
resources are for the exclusive use of a VM; whereas, in other cases, such as that of 
processor time, the resources are multiplexed among all VMs.  Within these smaller 
versions (VMs) of the actual computer, resources are managed in a fashion similar to 
those of the original machine.  Thus, the system programmer is able to test changes on a 
“virtual” image of the actual machine, and because this smaller “virtual machine” version 
of the real machine is logically isolated from the other virtual machines, if it crashes the 
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other virtual machines are unaffected.  Partitioning a large system into smaller virtual 
images of itself allows efficient testing of differing design decisions of system programs.   
In order to create multiple running simulated copies on a single host machine, 
IBM developed a construct it called the Control Program or CP for short.  IBM also 
developed a simple single user operating system called the Conversational Monitor 
System (CMS) that could be loaded on top of the Control Program.  The Control Program 
was responsible for interpreting the virtual instructions of the CMS and multiplexing the 
processor and storage between multiple copies of the CMS.  The IBM 360 model 67 with 
CP/CMS loaded was the first widely available virtualization system [5].  IBM produced 
the 360 model 67 around 1967 to provide a platform for a next generation time sharing 
environment to universities and large corporations that allowed them to share computing 
resources between departments and users.  
What IBM termed as the “Control Program” has become known as a virtual 
machine monitor (VMM).  A virtual machine monitor is software that provides isolated 
simulated copies of the actual machine environment for the virtual machines to operate in 
and controls access of the VMs to the actual system resources. Goldberg defines VMMs 
as: 
Software which transforms the single machine interface into the illusion of 
many.  Each of these interfaces (virtual machines) is an efficient replica of 
the original computer system, complete with all the processor instructions 
(i.e., both privileged and non-privileged instructions) and system resources 
(i.e., memory and I/O devices). [6] 
Goldberg made an effort to clearly define what can be classified as a virtual 
machine.  One of the requirements was that it be efficient.  His definition of efficient was 
that “a statistically dominant subset of the virtual processor’s instructions execute on the 
host processor in native mode” [1].  He explained that the performance of virtual 
machines is bounded between that of the real machine and a machine where all 
instructions are interpreted by software.  In contrast to simulators and emulators, he 
reserves the term virtual machine for a system for which the subset of instructions that 
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are directly executed on the hardware is maximized.  He further classifies virtual machine 
monitors into categories of Type I, Type II and Hybrid.  
Because the concept of virtual machines was just emerging, many processors had 
not been built to support the special requirements of a virtual machine. The ultimate goal 
of a processor architecture designed to support the requirements of virtual machines is to 
provide an execution environment, such that software executing in the virtual machine 
cannot distinguish between the virtual and the real hardware environment.  To create such 
an environment, it is necessary to ensure that the operation of one virtual machine does 
not affect that of any other virtual machine in operation. This means that the hardware 
state of the virtual processor must appear to be used exclusively by the particular VM and 
should not be affected by the execution of the other VMs. Goldberg described 
requirements that hardware had to provide in order to be able to support a virtual 
machine.  
1) Non-privileged instructions must be executed in nearly the same manner in 
both privileged and non-privileged states on the processor. 
2) A means of protecting the space of the VMM and active VMs from each other 
such as address translation (i.e., segmentation or paging). 
3) A means must be provided for notifying the VMM when a virtual machine 
attempts sensitive instructions. This means of notifying or trapping must not 
cause unrecoverable errors.  And it must be possible for the VMM to simulate 
the effect of the instruction. Sensitive instructions include: 
a. Instructions that change the state of the machine.  (i.e., privileged and non-
privileged states). 
b. Instructions that read or write to sensitive system registers. 
c. Instructions that reference mechanisms that the VMM uses to create or 
manage the VMs such as, the memory system, or storage protection 
mechanisms. 
d. All I/O instructions. 
A Type I VMM is described as running directly on hardware.  It is kernel-level 
software developed with the means to support virtual machines.  This software must be 
able to schedule and allocate CPU, memory, I/O and storage resources of the physical 
machine.  A Type I VMM executes directly on the hardware as in Figure 1.  Unmodified 
guest operating systems execute at the VMM interface.  In order for a machine to be able 
to support a Type I VMM, it must have means to support each of the hardware 
requirements listed above.  IBM System/370 [7], its descendant z/VM [8], and 
Microsoft’s Hyper-V server [9] are examples of a Type I VMM. 
 
 
Figure 1. Type I VMM 
 
A Type II VMM is loaded as an application on an existing host operating system.  
The Type II VMM provides virtualization support but relies on the host operating system 
to handle the scheduling and allocation of system resources.  A Type II VMM is 
generally depicted with the host operating system located closest to the hardware, as in 
Figure 2.  To support a Type II VMM, hardware must support the same rules stated 
above, but there must be additional requirements to ensure the host OS does nothing to 
invalidate the rules above.  First, the host OS must not invalidate the requirement that the 
non-privileged instructions execute roughly the same in privileged and non-privileged 
modes.  Second, the host OS must have the means to protect the VMM from other VMs 
and processes. Third, the host OS must have a means of signaling the VMM when a VM 
attempts to execute a sensitive instruction. VMware Workstation [10] is a modern 
example of a Type II VMM.  VMware Workstation operates as an application on either a 




Figure 2. Type II VMM 
 
A hybrid VMM is described as a VM where all supervisor or privileged 
instructions are interpreted.  This type of VMM was developed mainly as a simple way to 
overcome implementation difficulties created by hardware that was not designed to 
support virtualization. 
It is common in the literature to see the term hypervisor used interchangeably 
with VMM.  The term hypervisor may have come from the IBM/370’s use of the term 
hypervisor-call to refer to a call a guest operating system could use to access services 
from a more privileged control program.   
B. SECURE VIRTUAL MACHINE MONITORS 
In the Department of Defense and intelligence communities, the ability to ensure 
that classified material is not leaked to a lower security level is of profound importance.  
In a multilevel security environment, the flow of information that is allowed is 
determined by a security policy. The security policy is often described in an access 
matrix in which subjects (users, processes) are allowed various modes of access to an 
object (files, memory) through access rights found in the subject-object entry of the 
matrix.  To enforce the policy, the system must ensure that subjects only have access to 
those objects for which they are allowed in the access matrix and all other flows of 
information between subjects are not possible.  As Lampson [11] points out, there are 
quite a few channels that allow flow of information on shared systems; these must be 
considered to ensure correct policy enforcement.  There are also nontraditional means of 
information flow on shared systems.  Among these are covert channels.  A covert channel 
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is created when system mechanisms not intended to cause information to flow, are used 
to transfer information from one security domain to another in violation of policy.  In a 
multilevel system, it is essential that the system has the ability to control the flow of 
information and that unintended means of information flow have been identified and 
mitigated to ensure that information does not leak from one security level to another in 
violation of the intended security policy.   
The ability of a virtual machine monitor to create separate isolated environments 
on one physical machine has interested researchers and developers of secure computing 
systems through the years.  Madnick and Donovan [12] suggested the benefits of using 
VMMs for security and Rhode [13] was the first to present the idea of using VMMs as 
security kernels.  In the late 1970s, Systems Development Corp. built a security kernel 
implementation of IBM’s VM/370 called KVM/370. [14]  In the late 1980s, Digital 
Equipment Corp. created a VMM security kernel for its VAX architecture. [15]  This 
security kernel supported multiple virtual machines on a single VAX system and 
provided isolation and controlled sharing of sensitive data.  This security kernel applies 
both mandatory and discretionary access controls to virtual machines based on the Bell 
and LaPadula confidentiality [16] and Biba [17] integrity models, respectively.  It also 
applies access control lists on all objects.  In the VAX security kernel, there are two types 
of subjects: users and virtual machines.  Objects in this security kernel include virtual 
machines and virtual disks.   
To create a secure VMM, it is first necessary to make sure that any instructions 
that reveal or allow access to sensitive items such as memory page tables or processor 
state will trap so that the VMM security kernel can emulate their behavior.  When 
evaluating the VAX architecture against Goldberg’s requirements it was found that many 
of the instructions were sensitive and non-privileged and so required changes to the 
hardware architecture to allow these instructions to trap to the VMM.  A second hurdle 
that had to be surmounted was the ring mapping.  Hierarchical protection domains [18] 
are often called protection rings or privilege rings. These rings were designed to provide 
different levels of resource access for different modes of operation within a process.  The 
kernel code of the operating system may be given access to areas of memory or registers 
that application code would not be allowed access to.  Often, in systems that use privilege 
rings, there are 4 privilege rings labeled zero to three, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Protection rings. After [19] 
 
The rings are organized in order from most privileged at the lowest level (ring 0) 
to the least privileged at the highest level.  These privilege rings are a means for the OS 
to protect itself from faulty or malicious code of the applications it runs.  The OS can 
allow different levels of access to system resources by running applications at different 
privilege rings.  The level of access is enforced by the hardware.  Gates, or call 
instructions, are provided to allow less privileged applications to access resources in 
more privileged rings in a controlled fashion.  In most commodity OSs, only two 
privilege rings are used. The VAX architecture required the use of all four rings.  The 
VAX team came up with an approach they called “ring compression.”  Essentially, the 
VAX team ran the VM kernel and VM executive in the same privilege ring. Figure 4 
shows how the protection rings of the virtual processor are mapped to the protection rings 
of the actual VAX processor.  The VAX team states that though with this approach the 
virtual machine’s kernel mode is no longer protected from its executive mode, it was not 
a problem for the two OSs of interest to the VAX security kernel—and that compressing 





Figure 4. Ring compression. From [15] 
 
The VAX system also had to tackle another difficult area for VMM security 
kernels: the I/O interface. They created a specialized kernel call mechanism that ensured 
all I/O access trapped to the security kernel in a highly efficient manner.     
C. INTEL-BASED VMM FOR HIGH SECURITY 
In 2000, problems associated with implementing secure VMMs on Intel 
commodity processors were investigated [19]. The Intel platform’s 250 instructions were 
assessed against Goldberg’s requirements for virtualizability.  Seventeen instructions 
were found to be sensitive and unprivileged, leading to the conclusion that Intel’s current 
architecture should not be used as a development platform for a secure virtual machine 
monitor because it could not ensure secure isolation of classified and unclassified virtual 
machines. Another problem with developing a secure virtual machine on this architecture 
is that the code required to implement the VMM becomes large, due to the need to 
provide binary translation of the sensitive and unprivileged instructions of the 
architecture.  The size of the VMM kernel then becomes more difficult to evaluate 
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against high assurance requirements that call for minimization of the kernel. The benefits 
that a highly secure Type I VMM built on the Intel platform would provide if the 
architecture could support it were pointed out:  
First, a Type I VMM can provide a high degree of isolation between VMs. 
Second, existing popular commercial operating systems for the processor 
and their applications can be run in this highly secure environment without 
modification. [20]  
Intel has recently added hardware virtualization support that allows the architecture to 
meet Goldberg’s virtualization requirements.  
A more recent example of secure VMMs can be found in the Terra project, where 
a VMM termed a trusted VMM (TVMM) was created [20].  This VMM is considered 
trusted because it uses tamper-resistant hardware called the trusted platform module 
(TPM) to certify the firmware (BIOS), system boot loader, and the VMM.  The TPM is a 
crypto-coprocessor that has a private key and can generate SHA-1 hashes [21].  A hash 
can be generated for each piece of loaded code to ensure the code is an exact copy of 
what the system expected to load. The Terra project was built on commodity hardware 
with the intent to be able to run commodity operating systems.  In order to provide a 
“trusted” or secure path for users to communicate with the TVMM, Terra developers 
found several areas that would benefit from hardware support.  First, because commodity 
I/O device drivers could not be trusted, a means of creating a trusted path between the 
TVMM and devices, such as the keyboard, mouse, and video card, was needed.  One 
means of accomplishing this was to encrypt all communications with these devices, but 
this would have required moving the device drivers into the TVMM.  As an alternative, 
Terra developers split the device interfaces.  A video card driver could split the 2D and 
3D interfaces to allow the simpler 2D interface to be implemented in the TVMM and the 
more complicated 3D interface could be allowed direct access by the VMs.  Second, a 
secure counter that would only increment would improve security by providing 
protection from file system rollback attacks.  Third, Terra developers found that hardware 
support for controlling access to devices such as the DMA controller and PCI bus would 
allow the TVMM to not be required to trust the commodity drivers for these devices.  
Although the Terra TVMM may be ensuring that the VMM booted has not been modified 
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there is no discussion about whether a VMM can be considered trustworthy.  In addition, 
there is no evidence that Terra could be trusted to enforce a mandatory policy. 
As anticipated, hardware support for virtual machines on commodity processors is 
now beginning to be implemented in current Intel and AMD processors.  This hardware 
support for virtualization on commodity processors will likely extend the benefits of 
secure VMMs beyond the mainframe environments of finance, telecommunications and 
defense. 
D. SEPARATION KERNELS 
In 1981, J.M. Rushby wrote, “It is widely recognized that VMMs provide a 
suitable basis for the construction of secure systems” [22]. Rushby pointed out that one 
of the Achilles heels of the security kernels was that these kernels were designed and 
formally reviewed to ensure their mechanisms rigidly apply a multiple level security 
(MLS) policy, and yet to provide the practical functionality required in a typical user 
environment, multilevel processes would need to be created. An example of this was a 
simple print spooler. In order to get print spooling functionality, the spooler would have 
to become a ‘trusted process’ and be allowed  access to spool files at a range of security 
levels,  i.e., it is a multilevel process.  Rushby claims that, “The combination of a security 
kernel and trusted processes is hard to understand and even harder to verify because it 
does not represent a separation of concerns but a confusion of the same: neither member 
of the combination is independent of the properties of the other” [23].  He also pointed 
out that a formal model for a system comprised of this combination of security kernel and 
trusted processes was not available.   
Rushby proposed that separating specialized components and services and 
reviewing their security properties individually would allow for a cleaner formal proof of 
a system’s security properties.  To create this separation, he suggested a model similar to 
that of a distributed system.  And, to make this system cost effective, he suggested 
implementing it on a single processor.  To accomplish the implementation of a distributed 
system on a single system’s hardware, the physical security devices used in a distributed 
system would need to be implemented logically.  He pointed out that, for this 
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architecture, the security kernel’s purpose is to create this distributed environment and 
that the responsibility for security policy enforcement is that of the individual 
components and no longer centralized in the kernel itself.   
It becomes evident that the kernel component of this model resembles what we 
have described above as a virtual machine monitor.  Indeed, Rushby points out that,  
In an ideal, physically distributed implementation, each component of the 
system runs on its own private and physically isolated machine. The task 
of a security kernel, therefore, is to provide an isolated ‘Virtual Machine’ 
(VM) for each component and to handle communications between these 
virtual machines. A kernel of this form is obviously very similar to a 
‘Virtual Machine Monitor’ (VMM). [23] 
Rushby felt that there were significant differences between current 
implementations of the VMM concept and his proposed security kernel.  Specifically, he 
points out that his concept does not require that the VMM, “provide exact copies of the 
base hardware (or even for all the VMs to be alike)—but there is a requirement for it to 
provide communication channels between some of its VMs” [23]. So, to avoid confusion 
with the current definition of VMMs he decided to call his concept a ‘separation kernel.’ 
Separation means that one process cannot intentionally or unintentionally 
influence another process in ways that were not intended by the system.  As stated by 
Martin et al., “Any means for one process to disturb another, be it by communication 
primitives, by sharing of data, or by subtle uses of kernel primitives not intended for 
communication, is ruled out when two processes are separated” [23].  Again, this 
separation does not imply that there can be no communication between processes, only 
that it is verifiable that the only flow of information is by channels intended by the 
system.  So, a separation kernel’s purpose is to create, as Rushby stated, “an environment 
which is indistinguishable from that provided by a physically distributed system.” [23].  
Separation kernels may provide a foundation for the creation of multilevel secure 
systems (MLS).  Recently the Information Assurance Directorate of the U.S. National 
Security Agency published a guideline for developing separation kernels for 
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environments requiring high robustness.  This guideline is called the Separation Kernel 
Protection Profile (SKPP) [2]. This profile states some of the separation kernel’s core 
functionality expected as follows: 
 Protection of all resources including the CPU, memory, storage devices 
etc. from unauthorized access. 
 Separation of resources used for security from the resources provided to 
subjects. 
 Partitioning and isolation of resources provided to subjects. 
 Control of information flows between partitions and resources provided to 
partitions. 
 Implementation of the principle of least privilege (PoLP) to ensure 
subjects only have as much access to system resources as necessary for 
their intended functions. 
 
The last requirement, i.e., to implement the principle of least privilege, is often 
overlooked in separation kernel design due to the view that separation kernels are solely 
responsible for isolation of processes.  While isolation is a highly desirable quality of a 
separation kernel, use models often require that some communication between partitions 
be allowed.  As Irvine et al. state, “In practice, however, separation kernels are often used 
to share hardware among kindred activities that have reason to communicate in some 
controllable fashion” [24]. Allowing some controlled communication between partitions 
is often desirable even in secure applications.  To meet real world needs, separation 
kernels often provide controlled communication channels between partitions.  The 
problem lies in the fact that traditionally separation kernels were only concerned with 
secure separation of partitions, rather than the controlled sharing of resources between 
partitions. This can be solved in two ways.  First, by creating a special trusted partition 
that mediates all communication between partitions according to policy. Second, by 
applying the principle of least privilege in a way that permits controlled sharing among 
partitions in accordance with the overall security policy.  In an effort to address this issue, 
Irvine et al. describe a Least Privilege Separation Kernel (LPSK) model that “builds on 
the traditional separation abstraction by extending the granularity of described elements 
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to the subjects and resources within the partition” [25]. This granularity should be at the 
same level as the resources exported by the separation kernel.  
With the granularity of control at the same level as the resources exported, the 
separation kernel can control access to each resource within each partition.  This allows 
the LPSK to give a subject access to an individual resource within a partition while 
limiting access to other resources within that partition.   
The Trusted Computing Exemplar Project (TCX) [25] is intended to provide an 
open example of a high assurance trusted computing development process.  To 
demonstrate the high assurance development process, a high assurance micro kernel is 
being created.  This kernel is being developed to meet the requirements of the SKPP [2] 
and for evaluation at evaluation assurance level seven (EAL7) [26].  The kernel has been 
designed and implemented as a least privilege separation kernel.  The effort of this thesis 
will be to implement Intel hardware support for virtualization in the TCX LPSK.  The 
TCX LPSK could then be used to develop a highly secure VMM and reap the benefits 
described by Robin and Irvine [20].  
In early 1999, VMware developed techniques to work around the three concerns 
that Popek and Goldberg [27] determined made the Intel architecture non-virtualizable.  
They used binary translation to rewrite instructions that were both sensitive and 
unprivileged, data structures called ‘shadow page tables’ to emulate the MMU, and 
emulation of I/O devices to make the x86 architecture virtualizable.  VMware’s product 
was developed as a Type II hypervisor to operate on a host workstation OS.   
Most commodity OSs operate in what is called protected mode.  Protected mode 
is an x86 operating mode [28] and was designed to provide hardware, support for 
mechanisms, such as virtual memory, and paging that help protect the OS against 
applications it is running.  On an x86 processor that supports protected mode, the system 
will boot in real mode to maintain backward compatibility.  Protected mode can only be 
entered after the system initialization module sets up descriptor tables such as the global 
descriptor table (GDT) and enables the protection enable (PE) bit in control register zero 
(CR0).  The software must also set the 21st address line (A20) bit. The A20 bit is 
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originally disabled to allow the system to boot in compatibility mode.  When this bit is 
disabled, the 21st address line is not used allowing the system to access at most 220 bytes 
for a total of 1 megabyte of memory.  Enabling this bit in protected mode allows the use 
of all the address lines of the system and access to memory beyond 1 megabyte.  
A feature of protected mode, which protects the kernel from its less privileged 
applications, is the use of hierarchical protection domains [18].  As discussed earlier, 
hierarchical protection domains are often called protection rings or privilege rings. Intel 
documentation calls them hardware privilege levels (PLs).  In most commodity OSs, only 
two privilege rings are used. The OS operates at PL 0 (most privileged) and applications 
operate at PL 3.  This two privilege level approach creates an issue when trying to 
virtualize these systems.  The guest OS must be protected from its own applications but 
must still be prevented from accessing resources that must be controlled by the VMM.  
This problem has been addressed in a variety of ways by various vendors.  
To address this issue, VMware used the protection mechanisms (paging and 
segmentation) of privilege rings to ‘de-privilege’ the guest OS. VMware’s approach 
creates a Type II VMM, but is efficient enough that VMware became popular.   
Xen [29] developers preferred to make changes to each guest operating system, so 
that instead of executing sensitive unprivileged instructions in the guest OS, a call to 
VMM services is invoked. This approach is commonly called paravirtualization.  
Paravirtualization side steps the whole issue of sensitive and unprivileged instructions not 
trapping to the VMM, but takes on the added burden of rewriting areas of the guest VM’s 
code to ensure they do not use these instructions. 
Intel developed virtualization technology (VT) with the design goal of eliminating 
the need for paravirtualization and binary translation.  This technology made it easier to 
implement VMMs by addressing: sensitive instructions to ensure that they trap and thus 
eliminating the need for binary translation. Intel VT created two new modes of processor 
operation called VMX root operation and VMX non-root operation.  The VMM executes 
in VMX root operation and the VMs execute in VMX non-root operation.  Both modes of 
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operation support all of the privilege rings. This allows guest operating systems to 
operate at PL 0 as they were originally designed.  Intel VT allows the VMM to be simpler 
and allows support for unmodified OSs. 
Intel virtual-machine extensions (VMX) are new instructions added to the Intel 64 
and IA-32 architecture to support virtualization of the processor and system.  VMX 
includes five instructions that manage VMX operation and five instructions that manage 
the virtual machine control structure (VMCS).  These instructions are listed below and 
descriptions reflect the Intel documentation [30]: 
VMX management instructions: 
 VMXON- This enters the logical processor into VMX root operation.   
 VMXOFF- This instruction will cause the processor to leave VMX 
operation. 
 VMLAUNCH- This instruction launches a virtual machine with 
management data in the VMCS. 
 VMRESUME- Resumes a virtual machine managed by the current 
VMCS. 
 VMCALL- This instruction allows a guest VM to call the VMM for 
service.  A VM exit occurs, transferring control to the VMM. 
 
VMCS-maintenance instructions: 
 VMCLEAR- This instruction sets the launch state of the VMCS, renders 
that VMCS inactive, and ensures that data for the VMCS have been 
written to the VMCS-data area.   
 VMPTRLD- This instruction makes the referenced VMCS active and 
current, loading the current-VMCS pointer with the address of the current 
VMCS based on the contents of the VMCS-data area. 
 VMWRITE- This instruction writes a component to the VMCS.  
 VMREAD- This instruction reads a component from the VMCS. 
 VMPTRST- The current-VMCS pointer is stored into the destination 
operand. 
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A study of the Intel Software Developer’s Manual showed that a processor must 
be in protected mode with paging enabled in order to operate in VMX root operation.  As 
the LPSK prototype did not implement paging, it was first necessary to set up the paging 
structures and set the control register settings that were required to enable paging for the 
LPSK.  Once paging was enabled, it was necessary to prepare the system to execute the 
VMXON instruction to transition the processor to VMX root operation.  This section 
details the efforts required to set up the system for both paging and the execution of the 
VMXON instruction. 
B. SEGMENTATION AND PAGING 
In the IA-32 architecture, memory protection and management are provided by 
the use of segmentation and paging.  Segmentation provides a means of keeping the code, 
data and stack of different processes separate.  This allows multiple programs to run on 
the same system without interfering with each other’s memory space. In addition, for 
high assurance systems, segmentation provides a mechanism that can be simply and 
elegantly mapped to a formal model.  Figure 5 shows how segmentation is used to 
separate the linear address space of the processor into protected segments. 
 
Figure 5. Segmentation with paging.  From [31] 
 
As Figure 5 shows, paging can also be used in conjunction with segmentation.  
Paging takes the linear address space and divides it into equal size pages.  These linear 
address pages are then mapped to physical page frames using the paging data structures, 
as shown in the figure. Bits in the paging structures (page directory table and page table) 
can be used to control read and write access to individual page frames in memory.   
Segments have access permissions and limits associated with them, as shown in 
Figure 6.  When multiple programs are run the program’s code, data and stack segments 
are generally assigned to segments addressed by an appropriately named segment 
register: code segment (CS), stack segment (SS) and data segment (DS).  The hardware 
will enforce proper access to and the boundaries of each segment by checking the access 
and limit for each memory access made. Using local descriptor tables, each process on 
the system can be given its own segments and the hardware can then ensure that one 
process cannot read or write to another program’s memory space using the mechanisms 
provided by the segmentation structures. 
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Figure 6. Multiple segments.  From [32] 
 
In order to get the processor in VMX root, operation system software must 
prepare the system to execute the VMXON instruction.  The first requirement for 
executing the VMXON instruction is that the system be in protected mode with paging 
enabled. In protected mode segmentation is required but paging is optional.  The LPSK 
prototype was implemented using segmentation to provide isolation of processes but did 
not implement paging.  When segmentation is used without paging, the linear address 
space of the processor is mapped into the physical address space directly. Thus, memory 
management skips the page directory and page table structures when segmentation is 
enabled without paging.  In order to transition the processor to VMX root operation, it 
was necessary to implement paging.   
The Intel IA 32 architecture provides for three different modes of paging.  The 
three modes of paging are 32-bit paging, Physical Address Extension (PAE) paging, and 
IA-32e paging.  Software can determine the support a processor provides for different 
paging features using the CPUID instruction.  For the LPSK, a 32-bit paging mode was 
chosen as it used 32 bit addressing.  Paging is enabled by setting the paging bit in control 
register zero (CR0).  Control register zero is a 32 bit or 64 bit register (the register will be 
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64 bit only on an x86-64 processor in long mode).  The bits of the register act as control 
flags that can be set to modify the operation of the processor. Figure 7 shows the bits or 
control flags of control register zero.  In order to enable paging on the processor it is 
necessary to set the PG bit (or bit 31) of CR0.  In the Intel Software Developers Manuals 
it is common to see a reference to the 31 bit (or PG bit) of control register zero written as 
CR0.PG. This format for specifying specific bits of a register will be used in the 
remainder of this document.   
 
 
Figure 7. Control register 0. After [31] 
 
Before setting the CR0.PG bit and enabling paging on the processor, software 
must first set up the data structures necessary to support paging.  In 32-bit paging mode, 
linear addresses are translated using the page directory table and the page tables.  All 
paging structures in the IA 32 architecture are 4KB in size.  Some work had already been 
done on a function to set up the paging structures necessary to support paging in the 
LPSK. In particular, the setup_paging() function shown in Appendix A already had the 
code necessary to setup a 4KB aligned 4KB region in memory to be used as the page 
directory table.  The function also set up a total of 1024 regions, each 4KB in size, to be 
used as the page table structures. Once created, descriptors for each of these structures are 
then added to the Global Descriptor Table (GDT).   
In 32 bit paging mode, each paging structure contains 1024 32 bit entries.  Each 
paging structure entry contains a physical address, which either points to another paging 
structure or a page frame as shown in Figure 8.   
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Figure 8. 32-bit paging structures. After [32] 
 
Each entry in the page directory needs to contain the address of a page table that it 
references.  This is accomplished with a for-loop to set bits 31:12 to the physical address 
of the page table referenced by each entry.  Each entry has access control bits that must 
be appropriately set as well. The page table entries then must contain the physical address 
of the 4KB page referenced by the entry and have the appropriate access control bits set. 
Once the paging structures are created and linked, paging can be enabled by 
setting the necessary bits in the control registers. First, control register three (CR3) bits 
31:12 are set with the address of the page directory structure.  The system uses this 
control register to access the first paging structure when translating a linear address. 
Second, 32 bit paging uses CR0.WP (write protect), CR4.PGE (page global enable), and 
CR4.PSE (page size extension). Figure 9 shows the layout of control register four (CR4). 
 
 





The write protect bit of CR0, when cleared, will allow supervisor level processes 
to write to read-only pages.  For the LPSK this bit is set, thus inhibiting supervisor level 
processes from writing to read-only pages.  The PGE bit of CR4 allows frequently shared 
pages to be marked as global to all users.  While, the PSE bit allows the use of 4MB 
pages when set.  When the PSE bit is clear, page sizes are restricted to 4KB.  Both PGE 
and PSE were cleared to allow 4KB paging without global sharing of pages. Finally, to 
enable 32 bit paging, the page bit in CR0 must be set to one (CR0.PG = 1) and the 
physical address extension of CR4 must be set to zero (CR4.PAE = 0).  Since paging 
cannot be enabled unless protected mode is enabled, the system must also check to ensure 
that the protection enable (bit 0) of control register zero is set (CR0.PE =1).  
With the paging structures created, entries properly set and control registers set, it 
was assumed that paging would operate perfectly when the setup_paging() function was 
called.  Unfortunately, this was not the case.  Calling the setup_paging() function caused 
the system to reboot.  The first thought was that paging was being called before the GDT 
had been initialized.  This was ruled out by checking to ensure that the GDT had already 
been set up.  It was determined that the Task-State Segments, which define the state of a 
execution environment for a task, including the base address of the first paging structure, 
were not being set.  When the TSS section of the LPSK was written the code did not 
update the first TSS with the value of the physical address of the first paging structure 
from control register three (CR3).  Once the code was changed (line 1004 of 
tcx\trunk\kernel\kernel_ini2.c) to set the address from CR3 for the first task, paging 
worked properly. 
C. VMXON 
With the processor running in protected mode with paging enabled, a function to 
prepare the system to call the Intel IA 32 instruction VMXON was created.  This function 
was named setup_vmxon() and was added to tcx\trunk\kernel\kernel_ini2.c and is shown 
in Appendix B.  Before any other setup work could be performed, it was first necessary to 
check for the processor-specific hardware support to be provided for the VMM.  This was 
accomplished using the Intel IA 32 instruction, CPUID.  This instruction was introduced 
in the early 1990s to allow programmers a means of determining a processor’s make and 
model.  Before this instruction was available, programmers had to write code to exploit 
minor differences between processors to determine a CPU’s make and model [31]. The 
LPSK did not provide a function for calling CPUID so a function named get_cpuid() was 
created. The Intel Software Developer’s Manual states the following in describing the 
CPUID instruction, “The instruction’s output is dependent on the contents of the EAX 
register upon execution (in some cases, ECX as well)” [32].  This implies that the 
CPUID instruction takes no parameters as it explicitly expects its calling parameters to be 
provided in the EAX and ECX registers.   
As a primitive test of the functionality of get_cpuid(), it was called with a 
parameter of 0x0 in the EAX register. The processor returned the following values, as 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. CPUID 0x0 return values 
 
The vendor ID string (GenuineIntel) was spelled out in the values returned in 
registers EBX, ECX and EDX, which is the expected value for the processor being used 
for testing.  For the purposes of determining the support that the processor provides for 
VMX, CPUID is called with a value of 0x1 in the EAX register, which returns model and 
family information for the processor in EAX and feature-bits in ECX and EDX.  The 
values returned for the test processor are shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. CPUID 0x1- return values 
The values returned in ECX and EDX are interpreted using the Intel Software 
Developers Manual [36], as shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13, respectively. 
 





Figure 13. Values returned in EDX with CPUID called with a value of 0x1. 
From [36] 
 
If bit five in ECX is set (i.e., bit five equals 1), then the processor provides 
support for the Intel virtual machine extension instructions (VMX).  If VMX instructions 
are not supported, then the setup_vmxon() function halts the processor.  After checking 
that the processor supports the VMX instructions, the next step was to check whether the 
processor supports model-specific registers (MSRs). This can be accomplished by 
checking bit 5 of EDX. If this bit is set, then MSRs are supported by the processor.  
MSRs are read to determine the VMX capabilities of the processor.  VMX- 
specific MSRs are indexed starting at address 0x480 (Hex 480).  MSRs are read using the 
Read from Model Specific Register (RDMSR) instruction.   A function for calling the 
RDMSR instruction was not provided in the LPSK, so a function named get_msr() was 
added.  The parameter (the address of a model specific register) to this function is placed 
in the ECX register.  RDMSR returns the contents of the 64-bit MSR specified by the 
ECX register.  The high-order bits of this register are loaded into the EDX register and 
the low-order bits are loaded into the EAX register.  Constants were created for each of 
the MSRs used in the setup_vmxon() function.  The naming of these constants was 
designed to match the name of each MSR as it appears in the Intel Software Developer’s 
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Manual so that it is clear which MSR is being referenced (i.e., which value is being 
placed in the ECX register) with each call to get_msr().   
With the ability to read the MSRs, the system can now determine the processor’s 
requirements for the size and initialization value necessary to set up two control 
structures that are required for VMX operation.  The first of these control structures is the 
VMXON region.  This region is defined in the Intel Software Developer’s Manual as “a 
naturally aligned 4-KByte region of memory that a logical processor may use to support 
VMX operation” [33].  The second structure is called the Virtual Machine Control 
Structure (VMCS) and will be discussed in a later chapter.   
To determine the processor-specific requirements for the VMXON region, the 
IA_32_BASIC MSR must be read.  Bits 44 through 32 of this MSR determine the size in 
bytes that should be allocated for the VMXON region.  The Intel manuals use the 
notation 44:32 to describe a continuous run of bits starting at 32 and continuing to bit 44. 
This notation will be used in the remainder of this document.  The setup_vmxon() 
function reads the IA_32_BASIC MSR and uses the value returned (bits 44:32) to set a 
variable appropriately named region_size.  Then a memory allocation function provided 
in the LPSK is called with region_size as a parameter.  The memory allocation function 
returns the physical address of a 4KB aligned region in memory that has a size equal to 
region_size.  The only initialization of this region that is required is to set bits 31:0 equal 
to the value of the VMCS revision identifier.  This value is reported in the low-order 
(31:0) bits of the IA_32_BASIC MSR.  
Certain VMX controls are reserved and must be set to either one or zero.  This 
required value is called the control’s default setting.  MSRs are used to allow software to 
determine the default setting of a reserved control.  The default settings for reserved 
controls can change if new functionality is added in newer processors, so it is important 
for software to determine the default settings for the processor on which it is running.  




 Always-Flexible-These have never been reserved. 
 Default0-These are (or have been) reserved with default setting 0. 
 Default1-They are (or have been) reserved with a default setting of 1. 
 
The minimal set of control registers that must have their default values set to 
enable VMX root  operation on a processor are CR0, CR4, and the 
IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR.  The CR0.PE and CR0.PG bits were set previously 
when setting up paging, but it is necessary to check the MSRs specific to this register to 
determine whether there are any other bits that must be set for the specific processor 
model.  The two MSRs related to determining the required default setting of CR0 are, 
IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0 and IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1 MSRs.  The logic for 
determining how these two MSRs can be used to find the default value for CR0 reserved 
bits is explained as follows: 
They report on bits in CR0 that are allowed to be 0 and to be 1, 
respectively, in VMX operation. If bit X is 1 in 
IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0, then that bit of CR0 is fixed to 1 in VMX 
operation. Similarly, if bit X is 0 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1, then that 
bit of CR0 is fixed to 0 in VMX operation. It is always the case that if bit 
X is 1 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0, then that bit is also 1 in 
IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1; if bit X is 0 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1, 
then that bit is also 0 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0. Thus, each bit in CR0 
is either fixed to 0 (with value 0 in both MSRs), fixed to 1 (1 in both 
MSRs), or flexible (0 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0 and 1 in 
IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1). [35]  
The logic reduces to: if a bit is 1 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0 then this bit in 
CR0 must be set to 1, and if a bit is 0 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1 then that bit in CR0 
must be set to 0.   
The return values for IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0 and IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1 
for the target processor in this work are shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14. MSRs showing required values for CR0 
 
Although it was already known that CR0.PG (bit 31) and CR0.PE (bit 0) are 
required to be set, reading the MSRs for this register showed that it was necessary to 
ensure CR0.NE (bit 5) was set as well.  The setup_vmxon() function reads the CR0 
MSRs and ensures that CR0 is set according to the default settings required by the 
processor.   
Next, the CR4 MSRs, IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0 and 
IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1, are read and CR4’s bits are set according to the default 
values reported by these MSRs. The return values for IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0 and 
IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 for the target processor in this work are shown in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15. MSRs showing CR4 required values 
 
The CR4.VMXE (bit 13) is the only value that must be set.  This bit is the VMX 
enable bit and enables VMX operation when set.  Bits 31:15 and bits 12:11 must be clear 
while, bit 14, and bits 10:0 are flexible and may be set if the functionality (such as page 
size extensions (PSE),  physical address extension (PAE), enabling safer mode extensions 
(SMX), etc.) is desired for the VMM.   
Finally, the IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR is read. Although other VMX 
MSRs are read-only and will cause a general-protection exception (GP(0)) on any attempt 
to write to them, the  IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR is used in a similar fashion as 
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the control register CR4; the bits of this register are set or cleared to control the 
functionality of VMX operation.  The relevant bits of this MSR are described as follows: 
 
 Bit 0 is the lock bit. If this bit is clear, VMXON causes a general-protection 
exception. If the lock bit is set, WRMSR to this MSR causes a general-protection 
exception; the MSR cannot be modified until a power-up reset condition. System 
BIOS can use this bit to provide a setup option for BIOS to disable support for 
VMX. To enable VMX support in a platform, BIOS must set bit 1, bit 2, or both 
(see below), as well as the lock bit. [36] 
 Bit 1 enables VMXON in SMX operation. Attempts to set this bit on logical 
processors that do not support both VMX operation and SMX operation cause 
general-protection exceptions. [40] 
 Bit 2 enables VMXON outside SMX operation. Attempts to set this bit on 
logical processors that do not support VMX operation cause general-protection 
exceptions. [40] 
 
As with the CR4.VMXE bit, bit 0 of the IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR 
must be set in order to enter VMX operation.  The SMX, referred to in the description of 
bit 0, stands for Safer Mode Extensions and enables using a trusted platform module 
[37], i.e., similar to that described earlier in the Terra project.  SMX operation is not 
being used for the purposes of this effort so bit 1 is left clear.  
To enable VMXON without using SMX it is necessary to set bit 2 of the 
IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR.  The only problem with doing this was that it was 
assumed that these bits would be clear and that the setup_vmxon() function would need 
to set bits 0 and 2 to enable VMXON.  Attempts to set these bits would cause a general-
protection exception.  Upon printing the value in this MSR, it was realized that these bits 
were being set by the BIOS.  This would have been fine, but they were set for SMX 
operation and this was not desired.   As described above, once the lock bit (bit 0) is set it 
is not possible to change this MSR.  So this had to be changed in BIOS for the target 
platform.  For this platform, the setting was found enumerated in the BIOS user interface 
under the heading “Performance.”  The name of the field that had to be changed was 
named “Trusted Execution” in the BIOS user interface.  Once this was set to “off”, the 
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BIOS set bits 0 and 2 of the IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR as required for the 
testing being done with the LPSK.  The section of the setup_vmxon() function that sets 
the IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR bits was changed to check if the lock bit had 
already been set by BIOS before attempting to set any of the other bits.  If the lock bit is 
set, then the function determines if the bits are already set correctly with bit 2 and bit 0 
set.  If the bits are set correctly, then the function will call VMXON.  If the bits are set 
incorrectly, then the function halts the processor.  
With the setup necessary for the system to transition to VMX root operation 
complete, all that remains is to execute the VMXON instruction As follows:  “Execute 
VMXON with the physical address of the VMXON region as the operand” [38]. 
A search of the documentation and code for the Watcom [39] compiler that is 
used for the LPSK development showed that Watcom does not implement any of the 
VMX instructions, so it was necessary to write a pragma to call VMXON.  A pragma is a 
compiler directive that, for our purposes, can be used to direct the compiler to emit the 
operation code (opcode) for calling VMXON. 
Originally, this pragma was created with no calling parameters.  The address of 
the VMXON region was provided in a variable that was moved to the EBX register 
(using MOV EBX) within the pragma before the opcode for the VMXON instruction.  
The pragma was tested by calling the vmxon pragma with a parameter that has been 
assigned the address of the VMXON region.  The pragma moves the parameter value to 
the EBX register and then provides the opcode that the compiler must emit to call the 
VMXON instruction.  Calling the vmxon pragma with this parameter value caused a 
general-protection exception (GP()).  The Intel documentation for the VMXON 
instruction [40] provided some clues as to what could be causing the general-protection 
exception.  Intel provides the logic for the VMXON instruction in pseudo code.  Only 
one section of this pseudo code could cause the GP().  As shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. VMXON pseudo code. From [44] 
 
The first thing that stood out was the A20M mode.  The setup_vmxon() function 
did nothing with the A20 bit and there was no means to access it in the LPSK code.  A 
function was created to get and set this bit.  Changing the setting of this bit did not 
change the GP() received each time the vmxon pragma was called. (It was only after 
VMXON was working that it was determined that the A20 bit was not influential.)  Next, 
each of the CR0, CR4, and IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR were printed out and 
examined to make sure they were set properly.  Each appeared to be set according to the 
Intel specification for executing the VMXON instruction.  Some further information 
about why VMXON might cause a GP() was given in a note below the pseudo code, as 
shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17. Further explanation of VMXON GP() exceptions. From [44] 
 
This section gave a requirement that had not been checked: the source operand to 
VMXON must be for a segment referenced by any of the segment registers.  To 
determine if this was the cause of the GP(), the selector returned when the VMXON 
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region was added to the GDT, was copied into the GS register.  This way, it was certain 
that one of the segment registers would definitely refer to the segment that the VMXON 
region was within when VMXON was called.   
Unfortunately, this produced the same GP() exception. However, another 
reference to the requirements to the operand (or parameter) of VMXON stated,  
The operand of this instruction is a 4KB-aligned physical address (the 
VMXON pointer) that references the VMXON region, which the logical 
processor may use to support VMX operation. This operand is always 64 
bits and is always in memory. [44]  
This reference to a pointer seemed to indicate that the VMXON parameter may 
not actually be the address of the VMXON region, but a reference to where the address is 
stored in memory.  
A question posted to the Intel Forum returned the following response, “What 
VMXON takes is a reference to a memory location that always contains a “64 bit 
physical” address (regardless of which mode you are running in) which in turn points to 
the VMXON region” [41].  With this as a guide, a 64-bit location in memory was created 
and this location was assigned the physical address of the VMXON region.  The 
parameter passed to VMXON was assigned the address of the 64 bit location in memory. 
See Figure 18. 
 




Setting the VMXON parameter as described above and calling VMXON still gave 
a GP().  On a hunch that the processor may require that the VMXON region be 
referenced by the DS register, the VMXON region was allocated in the segment 
referenced by the DS segment register.  Trying this still produced a GP().  Following this 
train of thought further, it was determined to declare a variable to be used as the 
VMXON parameter.  This variable’s physical address will be within the segment 
referenced by the DS register.  Calling VMXON with the VMXON parameter and the 
VMXON region both in the segment pointed to by the DS segment register did finally 
transition the processor to VMX root operation.  To ensure that VMXON successfully 
transitioned the processor to VMX root operation, the EFLAGS.CF (bit 0) was printed to 
the display.  Upon successful execution of the VMXON instruction, this bit is set to zero.  
As a further test to ensure successful transition to VMX root operation, the VMXOFF 
instruction was called.  This instruction will only execute if the processor is running in 
VMX root operation.  If this instruction is called outside of VMX root operation, then it 
will cause an undefined opcode exception (UD) [42].  
To ensure that executing VMXOFF produced the expected UD exception when 
executed outside of VMX root operation, VMXOFF was executed before transitioning to 
VMX root operation and did produce a UD exception. After this test VMXOFF was 
executed after the processor had transitioned into VMX root operation. This time, 
VMXOFF executed properly (no exceptions) and the LPSK could now be successfully 
transitioned in and out of VMX root operation. 
It did not seem right that the VMXON region had to be in the segment referred to 
by the DS segment register.  So, tests were performed to see if the VMXON region could 
be allocated in other segments.  The first test placed the VMXON region in its own 
segment and set the DS segment register to refer to this segment.  The parameter to 
VMXON was left in the kernel data segment with the FS segment register referring to the 
kernel data segment where this parameter was allocated.   Calling the VMXON 
instruction this way caused a GP().  So, it is evident that the VMXON parameter must be 
referred to by the DS register, but the question remains as to whether the VMXON region 
can be in a segment referred to by a segment register other than DS.  
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A second test was performed to determine whether VMXON would work with the 
VMXON region in its own segment.  For this test, the DS segment register was set to 
refer to the kernel data segment where the VMXON parameter was and the GS segment 
register was set to refer to the segment where the VMXON region was allocated.  With 
the VMXON region and VMXON parameter referred to by two different selectors, it was 
possible to properly transition the LPSK into and out of VMX root operation.  Table 1 
outlines each test and its outcome. 
 































































IV. VIRTUAL MACHINE CONTROL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS 
A Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS) is a 4KB aligned region (VMCS 
region) in memory that a logical processor uses to store processor state information 
(control registers, segment registers, rflags, etc.), for both the guest and host during VMX 
operation.  The size and format of the VMCS is processor-specific and can be determined 
from the IA_32_BASIC MSR.  Bits 31:0 of this MSR are termed the VMCS revision 
identifier and are used to identify the specific format that a given processor uses for the 
data area of the VMCS.  The first 4 bytes of the VMCS must contain this VMCS revision 
identifier.  The next 4 bytes are reserved for the processor to store information about the 
cause of VMX aborts.  The remaining bytes are termed the VMCS data area and their 
format is determined by the processor.  The format of the VMCS region is shown in 
Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19. VMCS region format. From [43] 
 
The general layout of the VMCS data area can be broken up into six areas as 
follows: 
 The Guest-State area. 
 The Host-State area. 
 The VM-execution Control fields. 
 The VM-exit Control fields. 
 The VM-entry Control fields. 
 The VM-exit Information fields 
The fields of the VMCS data area can be accessed using the VMREAD and VMWRITE 
instructions.  Each field of a VMCS is associated with a 32-bit value called an encoding.  
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This encoding is provided to the VMREAD and VMWRITE instructions to read or 




Figure 20. VMCS component encoding structure. From [43] 
 
The width field tells the width of the field as shown.  Natural-width is 64 bits on 
processors that support Intel 64-bit architecture and 32-bit otherwise.  The index field is 
used to distinguish between fields that have the same width and type.   
This information is used to manage transitions to and from VMX non-root 
operation, and to manage processor behavior while in VMX non-root operation (for 
example, what causes a VM to exit?).  A VMM uses a separate VMCS to manage each 
VM that it provides resources for.  As shown in Figure 21, a VM-entry is a transition 
from the VMM in VMX root operation to a VM in VMX non-root operation, and a VM-
exit is a transition from a VM in non-root operation to the VMM in VMX root operation.  
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Figure 21. VM-entry/VM-exit 
 
On a VM-exit, a processor will store information about the cause of the VM-exit 
in the VM-exit information fields, store the guest state information, and load the host 
state from the current VMCS.  A processor can maintain multiple active VMCS, but only 
one VMCS can be current.  The VMLAUNCH, VMRESUME, VMREAD and 
VMWRITE instructions only operate on the current VMCS [43]. A VMCS is made 
current by executing the VMPTRLD instruction.  This instruction makes a VMCS active 
and current and provides a pointer to this VMCS for the processor to use to read and 
update the VMCS.  Some of the processor state loaded on VM-exit is based on the VM-
exit control fields of the VMCS. 
A VM-entry can be accomplished by software executing the VMLAUNCH or 
VMRESUME instructions.  Each VMCS has a launch-state field that is used to determine 
which VM-entry instruction is used.  VMLAUNCH requires a VMCS that has the 
launch-state field clear, while the VMRESUME instruction requires a VMCS that has the 
launch-state field set.  When either the VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME instruction is 
executed, the processor first checks to see if there is a current VMCS.  The processor then 
checks the fields of the control and host state areas of the current VMCS to ensure they 
are properly set to support VMX non-root operation.   
Once the fields of the control and host state areas of the VMCS are checked, the 
processor begins to check and load the guest state area of the VMCS.  Loading the guest 
state entails loading some of the state information of the processor, such as CR0, CR3 
and segment registers, from the corresponding fields in the VMCS.  Other state 
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information is loaded based on the control fields of the VMCS.  Checking the fields of 
the guest state area of the VMCS includes checking (1) that none of the control registers 
set bits that are not supported in VMX operation, (2) the access right fields of the 
segment registers, and (3) the GDTR and IDTR fields.  If all checks of the VM-entry 
succeed and all state information loaded to the processor is correct for the Intel IA 32 
architecture (this is checked during the VM-entry process), then transitioning to VMX 
non –root operation is allowed to proceed.  In this mode, the guest OS stack is associated 
with and managed by a logical processor.  Operation of the processor in this mode is 
similar to that outside a virtualized environment.   
The main difference between VMX non-root operation and ordinary processor 
operation is the instructions and memory accesses that cause VM-exits.  VM-exits are 
fault-like, in that the instruction causing the VM-exit is not executed and processor state 
is not updated.  Instead the instruction is handled by the VMM.  Certain instructions, such 
as INVD, CPUID, and all the VMX instructions, will always cause VM-exits.  Other 
events, such as task switches, will also cause VM-exits, as they are not allowed in VMX 
non-root operation.  Using the control fields in the VMCS, the VMM software can 
control the exceptions (faults, interrupts and aborts) that will cause VM-exits.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This work has shown that the LPSK can be modified to run in Intel VMX root 
operation.  Several changes were necessary to accommodate this.  A function to set up 
and enable paging had to be added to the LPSK.   It was also necessary to add get and set 
functions to the LPSK to accommodate changing the necessary control registers and 
accessing model specific registers (MSRs) of the processor.  These functions were used 
to determine the processor-specific setup requirements for VMX root operation.  Using 
the get and set functions, a function was constructed that read the necessary CPU 
information and set up necessary control structures in memory and properly set control 
registers and model specific registers of the test hardware.  
Finally, the compiler for this project did not have VMX instructions, so a 
compiler pragma was added that allowed the compiler to output the operation code 
necessary to call the VMXON instruction.  
Tests were necessary to determine the exact parameter requirements of the 
VMXON instruction.  The work required included: 
 Determination of the required mode of operation for VMXON, i.e., 
protected mode with paging enabled. 
 Determination of the paging mode that would work for the LPSK, i.e., 32-
bit paging mode. 
 Determination of the required settings for the paging structure entries.   
 Changing the task set up code of the LPSK to allow paging to function 
properly. 
 Determination of the control register settings to enable paging. 
 Creation of a function to set up and initialize the entries of the paging 
structures. 
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 Tests of the paging function. 
 Determination of the steps necessary to prepare the CPU to operate in 
VMX root operation. 
 Determination of how to read the CPU specific requirements for VMX 
root operation. 
 Addition of functions to the LPSK to access CPU–specific processor 
information, i.e., CPUID and MSRs. 
 Creation of a function to set up the necessary control structures for VMX 
operation (VMXON region and VMCS region), and read the CPU-specific 
requirements for the size and structure of the control structures.   This 
function also read the CPU-specific requirements for the control registers 
and MSRs related to VMX root operation, and ensured that these control 
registers and MSRs were set according to the CPU-specific requirements 
of the target processor. 
 Addition of pragmas were added to allow the compiler to produce the 
operation code necessary to execute the VMXON and VMXOFF 
instructions. 
 Tests to determine the requirements of the VMXON instruction. 
 Tests to ensure that the processor was operating in VMX root operation. 
With the outlined research, testing and modification, the LPSK ran in VMX root 
operation. 
B. FUTURE WORK  
The immediate follow-on work that should be performed is an analysis of the 
minimum requirements to setup the VMCS in order to launch a guest VM.  Some 
analysis of the VMCS structure has been performed and has been provided.  Further 
analysis will be necessary to determine the proper VMCS register settings and control 
settings required to operate the LPSK as a guest VM.  One item of interest will be 
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considering that in VMX non-root operation a task switch causes a VM-exit. This means 
the LPSK would require modification if executed in a VM.  Another item to consider will 
be whether to set up the LPSK as an unrestricted guest and what that might mean for the 
operation of the LPSK as a VM.  Setting the VM-execution control to allow unrestricted 
guest operation of a VM allows a VM to launch without paging and protection enabled, 
and can also allow the VM to operate in real-address mode. 
Future work may also include an analysis of the VMCS settings necessary to 
launch other OSs as VMs to an LPSK-based VMM.  Once VMs based on multiple OSs 
are operating, an analysis of the security provided by an LPSK-based VMM operating 
multiple VMs in isolated partitions would be possible.  It would also be interesting to 
determine if a resource such as a network connection could be securely shared among 
VMs running on an LPSK-based VMM.  Finally, work could be done to determine any 
VM-execution and VM-exit settings of the VM environments that will maintain security 
and make possible enhancements to the speed of the operation of the VMs in this 
environment.  
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APPENDIX A 
This appendix provides a copy of the code required to enable paging for the 









  *  This function performs the necessary steps 
  *  to setup and enable paging. 
  * 
  *  First a page directory structure is allocated 
  *  in physical memory.  Second, 1024 page table  
  *  structures are allocated. The size of each of these structures  
  *  (page table and page directory) is 4KB, 
  *  and the physical address of each is aligned  on 4K. 
  *  boundaries in physical memory. (One  
  *  contiguous block of memory is allocated for all 1024  
  *  page table regions so that only one selector  
  *  to this contiguous block in memory 
  *  is created in the GDT.)  
  *  
  *  We are enabling 32 bit paging- 
  *  mode, so each entry in the paging 
  *  structures is 32 bits.  Each entry must 
  *  contain a physical address that references  
  *  either, another paging structure, or references 
  *  the physical address of the region in memory to  
  *  which the linear address refers. 
  *  
  *  For the page directory table, each entry references  
  *  a 4KB page table structure. (For 32 bit paging,  
  *  the physical address to which the entry refers is placed  
  *  in bits 31:12 of each entry.) To set bits 31:12  
  *  of each page directory entry to the physical address  
  *  of the start of a page table structure, a loop  
  *  is provided that starts at the first address  
  *  of the page table structure that was allocated, 
  *  and steps (or adds) 4k to that address and sets  
  *  the next entry’s bits 31:12 to this address...   
  *  This loop also sets three flag bits for each entry: present 
  * (bit 0), read/write (bit 1) and user/supervisor (bit 2) flag 
  *  bits for each entry.  Then the page table entries  
  *  are set in a similar fashion, but this time each  
  *  entry in the page table references a 4k page frame  
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  *  in physical memory.       
  * 
  *  Next the control registers are set to enable 32 bit 
  *  paging. 
  *  
  *  CR4 page size extensions (bit 4), physical  
  *  address extension(bit 5), and page global 
  *  enable (bit 7) are cleared (set to 0). 
  *  
  *  CR3 bits 31:12 are set equal to the beginning 
  *  address of the page directory structure. 
  * 
  *  CR0 protection enable (bit0), write protect (bit 16) 
  *  paging (bit 31) are set 
  * 
  */ 
   /* Declare variables */ 
   int idx, idy, result, pgdir_size, pgtbl_size; 
   unsigned int *pgdir_ptr, *pgtbl_ptr; 
   unsigned int pgdir_addr, pgtbl_addr, curr_addr, ctrl_reg; 
   unsigned short pgdir_sel, pgtbl_sel; 
 
   /* Create the page directory region 
    * We need a selector to it, so we can write to it 
    * Size is 4KB, alignment is 4K 
    */ 
   pgdir_size = 0x1000; 
   result = kmem_allocate(pgdir_size, 0x1000, &pgdir_addr); 
   if (!result) 
   { 
 
      result = add_gdt_data_segment(pgdir_addr, pgdir_size, 0, 
                                    RW, &pgdir_sel); 
   } 
   if (result) 
   { 
      printf_int("Can't add page directory region %d\n", result); 
      chalt(); /* Never returns */ 
   } 
   pgdir_ptr = make_ptr(pgdir_sel, 0); 
 
   /* Create the page table region 
    * We need a selector to it, so we can write to it 
    * We need a total of 1024 4KB page tables, but don't  
    * want to make that many entries 
    * in the GDT, so just make 1 segment to hold 
    * all the 4KB page table regions. 
    * Size of the segment containing the page table 
    * entries is 4KB * 1024, alignment is 4K. 
    */ 
   pgtbl_size = 0x1000 * 1024; 
   result = kmem_allocate(pgtbl_size, 0x1000, &pgtbl_addr); 
   if (!result) 
   { 
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      result = add_gdt_data_segment(pgtbl_addr, pgtbl_size, 0, 
                                    RW, &pgtbl_sel); 
   } 
   if (result) 
   { 
      printf_int("Can't add page table region %d\n", result); 
      chalt(); /* Never returns */ 
   } 
   pgtbl_ptr = make_ptr(pgtbl_sel, 0); 
 
   /* Now fill in the page table. 
    * Each entry of the page table references a 4KB page 
     * frame, the physical address of the page frame to which 
     * the entry refers is placed in bits 31:12 of each entry. Also, for  
     * each entry we set the present (bit 0), read/write (bit 1) and 
     * user/supervisor (bit 2) flag bits.  
   */ 
 
   curr_addr = 0x0; 
   for (idx=0; idx < 1024; idx++) 
   { 
      for (idy=0; idy < 1024; idy++) 
      { 
         /* This sets the page base address */ 
         pgtbl_ptr[(idx*1024) + idy] = curr_addr; 
         /* Now set bit fields */ 
         pgtbl_ptr[(idx*1024) + idy] |= 0x7;    /* Present bit */ 
         /* Setup for next page address */ 
         curr_addr += 0x1000; 
      } 
   } 
    
   /* Now fill in the directory table. 
    * Each entry of the directory table references a 1k page 
    * table structure, the physical address of the page table to which 
    * the entry refers is placed in bits 31:12 of each entry. Also, for  
    * each entry we set the present (bit 0), read/write (bit 1) and 
    * user/supervisor (bit 2) flag bits.  
   */ 
     
   curr_addr = pgtbl_addr; 
   for (idx=0; idx < 1024; idx++) 
   { 
      /* This sets the page table base address */ 
      pgdir_ptr[idx] = curr_addr; 
      /* Now set bit fields */ 
      pgdir_ptr[idx] |= 0x7;    /* Present bit */ 
      /* Setup for next page table address */ 
      curr_addr += 0x1000; 
   } 
  
   /* make sure PSE, PAE and PGE bits in cr4 are clear */ 
 
        ctrl_reg = get_cr4(); 
 /* if CR4.PSE (page size extensions- bit 4) is set-  
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       * clear the bit  
 */ 
 
        if ((ctrl_reg & 0x10) != 0) ctrl_reg ^= 0x10;  
 
   /* if CR4.PAE (physical address extension- bit 5) is set-  
   * clear the bit   
   */ 
        if ((ctrl_reg & 0x20) != 0) ctrl_reg ^= 0x20; 
 
    /* if CR4.PGE (page global enable- bit 7) is set-  
   * clear the bit 
   */ 
        if ((ctrl_reg & 0x80) != 0) ctrl_reg ^= 0x80; 
   set_cr4(ctrl_reg); 
          
   /* Set the page directory address in CR3 */ 
 
      /* set address of page directory in bits 31:12 of CR3 */ 
set_cr3(pgdir_addr);     




   /* Enable paging, set PE, WP and PG bits in CR0 */ 
 
        ctrl_reg = get_cr0(); 
 
   /* set CR0.PE (protection enable bit- 0) if it is not set  */ 
        if ((ctrl_reg & 0x1) == 0) ctrl_reg |= 0x1;  
   /* set CR0.WP (write protect- bit 16) */ 
        ctrl_reg |= 0x10000; 
        /* set CR0.PG (paging- bit 31) */ 
   ctrl_reg |= 0x80000000;  
   set_cr0(ctrl_reg);  
       
} /* setup_paging */ 
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APPENDIX B 
This appendix provides a copy of the code required to transition the target 
processor of the LPSK into VMX root operation.  Code comments are provided in an 




/* setup VMXON  
 * 
 * 
 * This function performs the tasks necessary  
 *  to transition the LPSK into VMX root 
 *  operation.  
 * 
 * The parameter to this function (param_sel) 
 *  provides the selector to the segment in memory 
 *  that contains the VMXON parameter. 
 *  
 * First, all the model  
 *  specific registers (MSRs) are declared 
 *  as constants to make it clear which 
 *  is being referenced with each call.  Next, 
 *  the CPU identification (CPUID) is called 
 *  to determine if the processor supports 
 *  VMX operation and the accompanying VMX 
 *  related MSRs. IF VMX operation is supported 
 *  then the MSRs are read to determine 
 *  the processor specific size requirements  
 *  for the VMXON region and the VMCS region. The 
 *  VMCS revision identifier, which provides the  
 *  processor specific requirements for the data 
 *  portion of the VMCS, is read from the MSR as well 
 * 
 * A region in memory is allocated to be used for the 
 *  VMXON region.  This region is added to the GDT to  
 *  obtain a selector for this region. A pointer is 
 *  made so this region can be accessed.   * 
 * The necessary MSRs are read to 
 *  determine the processor specific 
 *  settings required for CRO, CR4 and the  
 *  IA_32_FEATURE_CONTROL MSR.  Once the 
 *  settings are correct VMXON is called to 
 *  transition the system to VMX root  
 *  operation. 
 *  
 * Note: location of functions used. 
 *  printf- Utility module. 
 *  kmem_allocate- Memory management module. 
 *  add_gdt_data_segment – GDT module. 
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 *  chalt- Utility module. 
 * */ 
 
void setup_vmxon (unsigned short param_sel) 
{ 
/* Variables for cpuid read function */ 
 int cpuid_eax, cpuid_ebx, cpuid_ecx cpuid_edx; 
  
/* Variables for rdmsr read function */ 
 int msr_eax, msr_edx; 
 
/* Function variables */  
 int       results, region_size, vmcs_revision_id, idx; 
  unsigned int   *vmxon_ptr;  
  unsigned int   vmxon_addr, ctrl_reg;  
  unsigned int   eflags; 
  unsigned short vmxon_sel; 
      unsigned long long *address_of_vmxon_param; 
 
/* Assign constant values for the model specific registers (MSRs)  
 * these registers have constant locations  
 */ 
 #define IA32_VMX_BASIC_MSR 0x480 
 #define IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0_MSR 0x486 
 #define IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1_MSR 0x487 
 #define IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0_MSR 0x488 
 #define IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1_MSR 0x489 
 #define IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR 0x3A 
 
/* check cpuid to see if vmx supported on this cpu */ 
 /* parameters for get_cpuid- first two are calling parameters 
  * that will be placed in EAX and ECX respectively, 
 * the last four are variables for the return values  
 * of this function  
 */ 
  get_cpuid(0x1,0x0, &cpuid_eax, &cpuid_ebx, &cpuid_ecx, 
&cpuid_edx); 
 
  /* bit 5 not set indicates no vmx support */ 
 if((cpuid_ecx & 0x20) == 0)  {  
        printf_1str("VMX not supported on this CPU!"); 
        chalt(); /*Never returns*/ 
  } 
/* bit 5 not set  indicates no support for model 
   * specific registers (MSRs)   
  */ 
 if((cpuid_edx & 0x20) == 0)  
                                    
  {  
        printf_1str("MSR not supported on this CPU!"); 
        chalt(); /*Never returns*/ 
  } 
 
/* Read IA32_VMX_BASIC_MSR to obtain processor 
 * requirements for VMXON region and VMCS region 
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 * (both regions will be the same size)  
 */      
      /* get IA32_VMX_BASIC MSR */ 
  get_msr(IA32_VMX_BASIC_MSR, &msr_eax, &msr_edx);  
   
/* get value in first 12 bits of this register  */ 
msr_edx &= 0xfff;  
 
/* bits 12:0 (44:32 of MSR) is the number of bytes that should be  
 * allocated for the VMXON & VMCS regions 
 */         
   region_size = msr_edx;  
 
 /* bits 31:0 are vmcs revision identifier for this cpu */    
  vmcs_revision_id = msr_eax;  
 
/* Allocate a region in memory of size "region_size" 
 * aligned at  a 4k boundary*  
 */   
/* allocate a region in memory of size "region_size" with  
 * physical address aligned at a 4k boundary. 
 * Parameters of kmem_allocate are as follows:  
 * size in bytes, boundary offset, variable to 
 * return address to region once assigned. 
 */ 
   results = kmem_allocate(region_size, 0x1000, &vmxon_addr);  
   if (!results) 
   {     /* parameters to add_gdt_data_segment are as follows:  
* beginning address of the region to be added, size of the  
* segment, highest privilege level that can access this  
* segment, access rights, variable to assign the selector  
* to this segment once it is assigned. 
*  
 */  
       results = add_gdt_data_segment(vmxon_addr, region_size, 0, 
RW,&vmxon_sel); 
 } 
   if (results) 
   { 
        printf_int("Can't add vmxon region to GDT %d\n", 
results); 
        chalt(); /*never returns*/ 
   } 
 
/* make a pointer to reference the VMXON region */  
 vmxon_ptr = make_ptr(vmxon_sel, 0); 
 
/* Set bits 31:0 of VMXON region to the vmcs revision id obtained from  
 * IA32_BASIC_MSR  
 */ 
 vmxon_ptr[0] = vmcs_revision_id;  
 
   
 
/* setup CR0 fixed bits according to MSRs */ 
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 /* get IA32_VMX_CR0_Fixed0 MSR */ 
 get_msr(IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0_MSR, &msr_eax, &msr_edx); 
  ctrl_reg = get_cr0(); 
 
   /* any bit set to 1 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0_MSR should be set to 1  
 * in CR0 
 */ 
 ctrl_reg |= msr_eax;  
 
 /* get IA32_VMX_CR0_Fixed1 MSR */ 
  get_msr(IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1_MSR, &msr_eax, &msr_edx); 
 
 /* any bit set to 0 in IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1_MSR should be 0 in CR0  
 *(other bits flexible) 
 */ 
  ctrl_reg &= msr_eax;  
 set_cr0(ctrl_reg);  
   
/* setup CR4 fixed bits according to MSRs */ 
 /* get IA32_VMX_CR4_Fixed0 MSR */ 
  get_msr(IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0_MSR, &msr_eax, &msr_edx); 
  ctrl_reg = get_cr4(); 
 
 /* any bit set to 1 IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0_MSR should be set to 1 in 
CR0 */ 
  ctrl_reg |= msr_eax; 
  
/* get IA32_VMX_CR4_Fixed1 MSR */ 
  get_msr(IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1_MSR, &msr_eax, &msr_edx); 
 
      /* any bit set to 0 in IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1_MSR should be 0 in CR0  
 *(other bits flexible)  
 */ 
  ctrl_reg &= msr_eax;  
 set_cr4(ctrl_reg); 
 
/* set bits in IA32_Feature_Control MSR */ 
 get_msr(IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR, &msr_eax, &msr_edx); 
 
  /* bit 6 not set in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR (cupid_ecx)  
 * no smx support (we will not use smx or 
 * measured VMM at this point) 
 */ 
 if((cpuid_ecx & 0x40) == 0)  
 {  
      printf_1str("SMX not supported on this CPU \n"); 
      pause("pause for smx not supported"); 
  /* This version of VMXON does not 
    *  use SMX so code can continue  
   * If SMX is required in the future code will go here  
 */ 
  } 
 
 /* If msr_eax bit 0 is set- then the lock bit is set-  
   * do not try to set or will get GP exception  
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 */ 
  if((msr_eax & 0x1) == 1)  {  
    /* bits 2 and 0 set incorrectly so halt*/ 
  if((msr_eax & 0x5) != 0x5)    {  
   printf_int("IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR is  
set incorrectly it isequal to... 0x%x\n", msr_eax); 
   chalt(); /* Never returns */ 
  } 
  }else /* bit 0 (lock bit) is not set,  
     * so we can write to the IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR  
  */ 
    { /* make sure bit 1 in MSR is 0  
 *(we do not want SMX operation at this time)  
 */   
    msr_eax &= 0x5;   
  /* set bit 0 and bit 2 in MSR (bit 0 is vmxon lock bit and 
 * bit 2 enables vmxon outside SMX) 
 */ 
msr_eax |= 0x5;  
    set_msr(IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL_MSR, msr_edx, msr_eax);  
        
   } 
 
/* Set parameter address for parameter to VMXON */ 
 /* get_vmxon_addr() returns a physical address of a 64 bit region  
 * of memory in the kernel data segment  
 */ 
 address_of_vmxon_param = (unsigned long long * ) get_vmxon_addr(); 
 
 
/* assign the physical address of VMXON region to the 64 bit location  
 * in memory that address_of_vmxon_param points to  
 */ 
 *address_of_vmxon_param = vmxon_addr;  
 
/* set gs segment  to refer to the segment that  vmxon region is within 
*/ 
       set_gs(vmxon_sel); 
  
/* execute VMXON */ 
 /*The parameters to the vmxon pragma are a physical address 
  * of a 64 bit region in memory (address_of_vmxon_param), 
 * this 64 bit region in memory is the parameter to VMXON, 
 * and the selector (param_sel) of the segment that 64 bit  
 * region is in.*/   
 vmxon(address_of_vmxon_param, param_sel); 
  
 printf_int("eflags after first VMXON = 0x%x\n", get_flags()); 
   pause(" for eflags after vmxon"); 
    
/* execute VMXOFF- this should only succeed if we are in VMM root 
 *  operation 
 */ 
 vmxoff(); 
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/* execute VMXON */ 
vmxon(address_of_vmxon_param,param_sel); 
     
 printf_int("eflags after second VMXON = 0x%x\n", get_flags()); 
   pause(" for eflags after vmxon"); 
    
 
}/* setup VMXON */ 
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APPENDIX C 
This appendix provides copies of the pragmas created to allow the Watcom 






/* VMXON  
 * 
 *This pragma is necessary because the Watcom compiler 
 *  does not support VMX instructions. This pragma 
 *  executes the VMXON instruction 
 * 
 * 
 * The addr parameter is the address of the  
 *    parameter to the VMXON opcode. 
 *    the address parameter is passed in the EBX  
 *    register.  This is the offset in the segment. 
 * The sel parameter is the selector of the segment  
 *    containing the parameter to the VMXON opcode, 
 *    this parameter is passed in the CX register. 
 * Thus, the selector and offset provide a full 
 *    pointer to the opcode. 
 * The VMXON opcode expects DS to refer to the  
 *   segment containing its address parameter. 
 * 
 * 0xF3 0x0F 0xC7 are the VMXON opcode bytes 
 * 
 * 0x33 completes the VMXON opcode and is its modifier byte *    this 
modifier tells the processor that the parameter 
 *    to the VMXON opcode is in EBX 






void __near vmxon(unsigned int addr, unsigned short sel); 
#pragma aux vmxon = \ 
      
     "mov ds, cx" \  
     0xF3 0x0F 0xC7 0x33 \ 












/* VMXOFF  
 * 
 * This pragma is necessary because the Watcom compiler 
 * does not support VMX instructions. This pragma 
 * executes the VMXOFF instruction. 
 * 
 * 0x0F 0x01 0xC4 are the VMXOFF opcode bytes. 
 *  
 */ 
  
void __near vmxoff(void); 
#pragma aux vmxoff = \ 
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